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CRITICS OF "FREE SPEECH" AND THE 
USES OF THE PAST 
Michael Kent Curtis* 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of a broadly defined right to free speech is under 
siege. One attack currently comes from those who see the "lib-
eral" idea of free speech as a threat to equality. The topic is 
complex and charged with emotion. It surfaces in questions of 
hate speech, in campus codes that seem to allow punishment 
even for some political speech not directly aimed at individuals, 
in discussions of "pornography," and in group libel laws. The 
issues raised are painful, and the divisions reflect scars left by 
oppression based on race and sex. (Curiously, the discussion 
often ignores issues of class and power.) 
Some of the critics would return to a test allowing suppres-
sion of speech with the "bad tendency" to produce evil results. 
Others advocate allowing courts to balance the benefits and evils 
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. I wish to thank Diann 
Baecker, Tom Curtis, and Professors Akhil Amar, Miles Foy, Sue Grebeldinger, Steven 
Heyman, David Logan, Alan Palmiter, Wilson Parker, Suzanne Reynolds, Margaret Tay-
lor, and Ronald Wright for suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. I also wish to 
thank my research assistants Ross Forbes and Paul Goodson for their assistance. The 
mistakes and misconceptions are my own. 
Before I became a law school teacher, I represented clients in many cases, and some 
of these clients were unpopular. My clients included conscientious objectors prosecuted 
for refusing to serve in the military; students who were prevented from publishing an 
article on teenage pregnancy and birth control in their school newspaper; a member of 
the Black Panther party, prosecuted for sale of the party newspaper in downtown Bur-
lington, North Carolina; a member of the Revolutionary Communist party (as court ap-
pointed counsel) in a criminal prosecution; students suspended from public school for 
wearing a Confederate ftag emblem to school; clients who objected to the motorist prayer 
on a state road map; black motorists who had taped over the slogan "first in freedom" on 
their North Carolina license plates (they did not believe our state was unsurpassed in 
protection of human liberty); a minister arrested for reading from the Bible in downtown 
Greensboro to protest a semi-nude stroll on Greensboro's new semi-mall (an ordinance 
forbade speaking or preaching in downtown Greensboro); and people accused of various 
crimes including obscenity violations. I also represented women in sex discrimination, 
equal pay, and harassment cases, a black child denied access to a lake during a class visit, 
an interracial couple in a housing discrimination case, etc. As Professor Daniel Pollitt, my 
constitutional law professor, taught years ago, I believe that lawyers have a responsibility 
to represent unpopular clients. 
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of speech on an ad hoc basis-protecting speech when the judge 
thinks the benefits of protection in the particular case outweigh 
the evil done by the speech. Professor Stanley Fish, for example, 
embraces ad hoc balancing. Professor Catharine MacKinnon 
likes the bad tendency test and would replace viewpoint neutral-
ity with a test frankly weighted in favor of the "oppressed" and 
against "oppressors." Professor Mari Matsuda would also aban-
don neutrality, often allowing blacks to direct hateful speech at 
whites, but not vice versa. To protect black students from emo-
tional distress she would (it seems) support banning Huckleberry 
Finn from some classrooms.! 
This essay will examine these suggestions for basic change in 
first amendment doctrine in light of history. Since these propos-
als to restrict the idea of free speech are reactions against current 
doctrine, I will quickly review some basic free speech doctrine. 
Then I will look at episodes from the history of freedom of 
speech, especially at the effort to suppress anti-slavery expression 
in the years before the Civil War. Finally I will suggest ways that 
can sometimes be used to transcend current controversies over 
free speech. 
Many advocates of new restrictions on speech based on its 
ideas or point of view pay little attention to free speech history. 
As a result, while critics have deepened our understanding by 
highlighting some of the costs of broad protection for speech that 
is evil, they have left the benefits of protection and costs of 
changing it in darkness. 
When they ignore free speech history, advocates of restric-
tion have plenty of company. With a few notable exceptions,2 
American legal education has paid too little attention to either 
the history of liberty or of free speech. In the past powerful in-
terests have sought to limit speech by use of the bad tendency 
test, by use of ad hoc balancing, by treating political speech as 
libel, and by demanding protection from emotional distress 
caused by speech. From the Sedition Act to the crusade against 
slavery, to the opposition to wars and the draft, elites have ad-
1. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech and it's a Good Thing Too 
127 (Oxford U. Press, 1994); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words 104, 76-77 (Harv. U. 
Press, 1993); Marl J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the V~etims's 
Story, '07 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2358-60, 2369 (1989). 
2. A fine historical discussion appears in William W. Van Alstyne, The First 
Amendment, Cases and Materials (Foundation Press, 1991); among general constitutional 
law casebooks a very good brief introduction appears in William Cohen and Jonathan D. 
Varat, Constitutional Law, Cases and Materials (Foundation Press, 1993). 
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vanced such doctrines as justifications for suppression of speech, 
including political speech. 
Because history provides vicarious experience, an examina-
tion of the history of suppression should be a part of evaluation 
of plans to revise free speech. The past cannot solve our present 
problems, but it can provide expanded experience by which to 
make practical judgments. It also suggests the need to search for 
new ways of transcending current battles over free speech. 
I. FREE SPEECH DOCfRINE AND ITS HISTORY 
A. FREE SPEECH THEORY 
Free speech doctrine embraces the idea of a public domain 
where government may not suppress discussion because of the 
ideas advanced, especially on matters of public concern. Matters 
of public concern should be broadly understood to include all 
those ordinary and personal matters as to which people seek to 
structure or transform their lives. Since social action is a primary 
method of transformation, protection of speech about social ac-
tion is a central concern of free speech doctrine. In practice, the 
public domain (used here to mean the area where speech is pro-
tected) is bounded by definitions of protected and unprotected 
content (e.g. political speech and obscenity) and protected and 
unprotected fora (e.g. in a public park or in a pamphlet, in con-
trast to someone else's church service). 
The idea of a public domain for free speech is implicit in 
representative government. The argument from democracy is 
one, but only one, justification for free speech. Other justifica-
tions recognize that speech is essential to self-fulfillment, to the 
advancement of knowledge and the discovery of truth, and to the 
right to participate in how one's life and society are structured.3 
One metaphor embraced by advocates of representative 
government is that of agency. Like all metaphors, at best this 
one only approximates reality.4 In the agency metaphor, the 
people are the principal, elected officials are the agents, and free 
speech in the public domain is an essential technique by which 
3. C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech 41-48 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1989); Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-1 (Random 
House, 1970). 
4. Public officials may, ideally, be more like a combination of an agent and a 
trustee than like a pure agent. 
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the people may consult, set the agenda, and decide on the course 
of conduct for their agents.s 
The agency theory has radical implications. Elections, even 
elections with competing political parties, are not the main mea-
sure of democratic government. Instead, democratic government 
requires free discussion and association so that people can dis-
cuss and decide how they collectively would seek to structure 
their lives. It also requires that information relevant to political 
choice be available to participants in the political system. To the 
extent that association, discussion, and dissemination of relevant 
information are suppressed, government is less democratic.6 Us-
ing the word democracy in this sense, Stuart Sutherland suggests 
that, because of the Official Secrets Act forbidding government 
employees from disclosing anything learned in the course of their 
duties, the United Kingdom is "one of the least democratic coun-
tries in the Western world."' 
The public domain provides a safe space that can be used for 
many purposes, including discussion and setting agendas.s In 
theory, and to some degree in practice, it is a place where the 
claims of power may be challenged and the abuses of the power-
ful exposed.9 That free speech often falls short of this ideal 
5. E.g., Michael Kent Curtis, In Pursuit of Liberty: The Levellers and the American 
Bill of Rights, 8 Const. Comm. 359,367-68 (1991); 1 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, 
Cato's Letters 100-03 (6th ed. Da Capo Press Reprint, 1971) (1755); Address to the In-
habitants of Quebec, 1774, in 1 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 222 (Bernard 
Schwartz, ed., Chelsea House Publishers, 1971); David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Histo-
rian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 
795, 823 (1985). 
6. Historically, government action has not been the only threat to free speech. In 
spite of judicial decisions on the question, both the text and structure of the Constitution 
should provide ample power for the national government to protect citizens against pri-
vate, violent suppression of speech. The Constitution contemplates a republican form of 
government, not only for the federal government but also for the states. Such a form of 
government requires freedom to advocate unpopular causes and to join together for col-
lective political action. Anyone, private or public, who acts for the purpose of sup-
pressing speech on matters of public concern, threatens republican government. 
Successful private suppression destroys republican government. Nor does federal action, 
limited to suppression of political terrorism, threaten a healthy federalism. In fact, it 
supports it. States can hardly function as a laboratory for new ideas if the ideas them-
selves can be silenced by politically motivated violence. 
7. Stuart Sutherland, Irrationality, The Enemy Within 84 (Penguin, 1992). 
8. For a thoughtful discussion of the complexities implicit in this idea see Robert C. 
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic 
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1990). 
9. E.g., J. Anthony Lukas, Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Years (Vtking 
Press, 1973); Jonathan Schell, The Tune of lllusion (Alfred A. Knopf, 1975); Russell L. 
Weaver and Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York TilDes "Actual Malice" Standard Really 
Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 La. L. Rev. 1153, 1174 (1993) (indicating that 
the British press would not have reported the Watergate story as the Wash:ington Post did 
and that in general the British media is "far more timid" than the Amencan). 
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should not surprise us. What should surprise us, given the re-
markable tenacity of economic and political power, is that it 
sometimes comes so close. 
The concepts of a "public domain" and of protection against 
censorship based on "content" both conceal problems behind 
their superficial simplicity. The idea of a public domain implies 
boundaries. Setting boundaries allows governmental suppres-
sion-for those things outside the boundary. So if obscenity is 
outside the circle of speech in the public domain, that expression 
about sexuality is unprotected. Since some types of "action" are 
outside the area of protection, the speech treated as such action 
is unprotected.lo The agency model is also problematic. One of 
its assumptions (and an assumption behind representative gov-
ernment), is that the people represented have an equal right to 
influence government policy. Realities of wealth, power, and sta-
tus produce significant deviation from this ideal. Fmally the ar-
gument derived from democracy contains a paradox. A 
representative government can make a decision to limit free 
speech or democracy. But to the extent of the departure, repre-
sentative government becomes something else. If the departure 
from free speech is sufficiently substantial, government is no 
longer democratic or representative. 
In American history, the public domain free from censorship 
has never included all speech. Libel, books about sexual themes, 
advocacy of birth control,n criticism of slavery,12 criticism of war 
and the draft,t3 and "false and malicious" criticism of govern-
ment officialst4 have all, at one time or another, been treated as 
outside the domain of free speech. Proposals to restrict free 
speech rights focus on the boundaries of the space allocated to 
free speech. Changing the boundaries, in turn, involves changes 
in free speech doctrine, because doctrine sets the boundaries that 
protect "speech" from suppression. Just such a change is advo-
cated by current critics. 
10. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); on the nature of boundaries, see 
Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (cited in note 8). 
11. Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History 160-62 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1989). 
12. Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impend-
ing Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the 
Founeenth Amendment, 68 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 1113 (1993). 
13. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Ex pane Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 
Wall.) 243 (1863). 
14. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865); United 
States v. Callender, 25 F.Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709); Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas. 
1183 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798) (No. 8,646). 
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This essay will focus on efforts to enhance equality by cen-
soring some types of currently protected speech. A major impe-
tus for revising free speech doctrine has been an expressed desire 
to promote racial and sexual equality. "Equality," like "free 
speech," is not a self-defining concept. Nor, of course, is it clear 
that suppressing speech that is currently protected will enhance 
equality. 
Curiously, law professors often devote more attention to ad-
vancing equality by limiting speech than to advancing equality 
through economic change, access to education, guaranteed em-
ployment, or for redistribution of wealth. In part this fact may 
simply reflect the occupational biases of law professors. Law 
professors most often write about changes in judicial doctrine or 
in legislation that seem practical. Significant redistribution of re-
sources is unlikely to come from courts. Indeed, there are pow-
erful arguments that substantially redistributing wealth is an 
inappropriate role for judges. Nor, in the current political cli-
mate, is significant redistribution likely to come from the legisla-
ture. By conventional wisdom we cannot afford such changes. 
Changes in free speech doctrine, however, seem cheap. They are 
unlikely to be accompanied by a tax hike. They come from 
courts with some regularity, and legislators are often quite ready 
to initiate changes in free speech doctrine by proscribing expres-
sion they find obnoxious. 
Historically, free speech has been an aid to those seeking 
social change. Control of "speech" has been used by those in 
power to retain power and repress criticism and change. (Of 
course suppression of speech because of the ideas expressed is 
only one means of social control.) Those who contest the views 
of those in power and who advocate change opposed by the pow-
erful have needed and claimed the protection of free speech to 
advance their ideas. Though the protection is necessary, it may 
not be sufficient. In addition to the ability to speak, dissenters 
need the ability to be heard, to be taken seriously, and to share in 
setting the political agenda. 
Modem first amendment doctrine has attempted to protect 
speech critical of those in power from suppression by creating 
"general" rules that secure free speech on matters of public con-
cern and limit categories of speech where suppression is permis-
sible. As to matters of public concern, speech may not ordinarily 
be suppressed because of the ideas-even hateful ideas-it ex-
presses. Even advocacy of lawlessness or violence may not be 
suppressed unless it is directed to inciting imminent lawless ac-
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tion and is likely to incite or produce such action.ts False and 
defamatory statements about public officials may not be sanc-
tioned unless intentionally false or published in reckless disre-
gard of the truth.t6 Books dealing with sex may not be 
suppressed if they contain "serious value."t7 
Conversely, categories of speech subject to suppression have 
been narrowly defined. Indeed, from the 1930s through the War-
ren Court, the Court tended to narrow the exceptions to the first 
amendment-like libel, obscenity, fighting words, and advocacy 
of lawlessness-and consequently to expand the boundaries of 
the domain in which speech was protected. 
Though the protection of speech by the Warren Court had 
its limits,ts protection for dissenters was remarkable. The United 
States has gone through periods of protection of free speech and 
periods of repression. Generally repression comes from fear, 
from perceived threats to national or personal safety. 
B. SuPPRESSION OF SPEECH IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
In the late 18th century Congress passed the Sedition Act. 
The Adams administration used the Act to prosecute supporters 
of Thomas Jefferson, Adams' likely opponent in the 1800 elec-
tion. The "false and malicious" criticisms that landed Jefferso-
nian newspaper editors and a Jeffersonian congressman in jail 
included charges that Adams was addicted to ridiculous pomp, 
favored a standing army, and was responsible for excessive 
debt.t9 
One powerful argument against the Sedition Act was that its 
suppression of political speech was incompatible with representa-
tive government.zo Jefferson was elected president and pardoned 
violators; the Sedition Act then expired. From the Sedition Act 
to the Civil War, Congress passed no legislation limiting speech 
and press. 
Before the Civil War, however, slave states, in effect, made 
criticism of the institution of slavery a crime.21 Northern states, 
15. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). 
16. New York Tunes v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
17. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
18. E.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367. 
19. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631; Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239; Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1183. 
20. Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 21, 1798 in Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., 1 Documents of 
American Constitutional and Legal History 160 (Temple U. Press, 1989). Another argu-
ment, rather inconsistent with the first, was that the national government lacked such 
power over speech because of the First Amendment, but that states retained such power. 
State governments were, of course, also representative. 
21. E.g., Curtis, 68 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 1130-38 (cited in note 12). 
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in contrast, refused to enact laws suppressing criticism of slavery. 
In many ways, the slavery debate provides an eerie mirror image 
of our current free speech controversies. There, however, the ar-
guments for suppression were used by slaveholders. Since I have 
told this story at length elsewhere,22 I will summarize it here. 
In 1835, American abolitionists began to advocate immedi-
ate, uncompensated abolition of slavery. They sent tracts to 
leaders in Southern society to convince them to abjure the sin of 
slavery. The tracts contained both language and woodcut pic-
tures designed to illustrate the cruelty of the slave system. Abo-
litionists also petitioned Congress, demanding an end to slavery 
in the District of Columbia. 
Many Southerners responded to the abolitionist postal cam-
paign with fury, as did many in the North. Mass meetings 
throughout the North condemned abolitionists. Northern mobs 
sacked newspapers and the home of a leading abolitionist. A few 
years later a mob burned a hall the abolitionists had erected in 
Philadelphia for free discussion. (Abolitionists had had 
problems finding places to speak, so constructing the hall was an 
attempted solution.) Southern states had passed laws that effec-
tively outlawed advocacy of abolition. Critics of abolitionists de-
manded similar laws in the North, without success. The federal 
House of Representatives did, however, pass a gag rule to pre-
vent abolition petitions from being read and discussed in 
Congress. 
Opponents of abolition advanced several legal theories to 
justify their proposed suppression of anti-slavery speech. One 
theory was group libel. As some Southerners in Congress saw it, 
abolitionist criticism of slavery held slaveholders up to scorn and 
derision and suggested that slaveholders were little better than 
kidnappers or receivers of stolen goods. If individual libel was 
criminal, so was libel of slaveholders as a group.23 Some sug-
gested, along with John C. Calhoun, that abolition agitation 
should be suppressed to protect slaveholders from emotional in-
jury-because the agitation was offensive to their feelings.24 
In the North and South, advocates of suppression invoked 
the bad tendency test. The South had experienced several slave 
revolts, which Southerners thought were inspired by anti-slavery 
22. Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Bill of Rights 26-56 (Duke U. Press, 1986); Curtis, 68 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 1113 (cited in 
note 12); Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Anti-Slavery 
Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. - (1995) (forthcoming). 
23. Id. E.g., Cong. Globe, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 119-20, 83, 158 (1836). 
24. Cong. Globe, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 83, 120. 
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propaganda. Anti-slavery agitation presented slavery as a cruel 
and exploitative institution. Ideas in abolitionist tracts (and par-
ticularly the woodcut illustrations) could, critics of the abolition-
ists insisted, find their way into the hands of slaves and produce 
slave revolts. Still another justification for suppressing anti-slav-
ery speech, press, and petition was the threat of civil war. If abo-
litionism succeeded in making slavery a political issue, 
Northerners and Southerners warned, the nation would be di-
vided on sectional lines. The ultimate result would be a civil war 
that drenched the nation in blood. This was a bad tendency 
indeed.2s 
Although the reasons given for silencing abolitionists were 
lofty-protecting the public peace and national unity-behind 
those reasons were the powerful economic interests of the slave-
holders and the Northern mercantile classes who traded with 
them. In 1859, John Bingham, later the main author of section 
one of the fourteenth amendment, put it this way. "These gentle-
men apprehend that if free speech is tolerated and free labor 
protected by law, free labor might attain ... such dignity ... as 
would bring into disrepute the system of slave labor, and bring 
about . . . gradual emancipation, thereby interfering with the 
profits of these gentlemen. "26 Abraham Lincoln warned of the 
"proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants."27 
By 1856, Southern demands to expand territory open to 
slavery had produced a massive party realignment in the North. 
In that year the Republican presidential candidate John C. 
Fremont made a strong run for the presidency. Most Southern 
states refused to tolerate the political dissent represented by the 
Republican party. In North Carolina, Benjamin Hedrick, a tal-
ented professor of chemistry at the University of North Carolina, 
was driven from his job and the state for publicly supporting 
Fremont. The Raleigh Weekly Standard exalted: "And we now 
say ... that no man who is avowedly for John C. Fremont for 
President, ought to be allowed to breathe the air or to tread the 
soil of North Carolina."2s 
25. The argument from the danger of civil war is so plausible, and the eventual Civil 
War was so horrible, that I feel impelled to point out the other side. To the extent that 
social change cannot be discussed peacefully and accomplished politically, the only 
method of change is violence. When the South quarantined itself against anti-slavery 
expression, it made peaceful change impossible. 
26. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1861 (1860). 
27. 2 Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 406 (Ray Basler 
ed., Rutgers U. Press, 1953). 
28. Mr. Hedrick, Once More, Weekly North Carolina Standard, Nov. 5, 1856, at I. 
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In 1857, Hinton Rowan Helper, another North Carolinian, 
published a book designed to convert the Southern masses to op-
position to slavery (though it did not advocate equality for the 
freed slaves). Helper advocated forming a Southern anti-slavery 
party, uncompensated emancipation, and colonization-sending 
the freed slaves to Africa or some equally remote location. Slav-
ery, he insisted, was responsible for the backwardness of the 
South and the depressed condition of many Southern whites.29 
Soon a group of influential Republicans, including many in the 
United States House of Representatives, hit upon the plan of 
condensing Helper's book and publishing it as a campaign docu-
ment. By 1859, when John Brown launched his raid on Harper's 
Ferry, the plan to publish an abridgment of Helper's book was 
well underway.3o 
Helper's book noted that free speech was denied to oppo-
nents of slavery in the South, and he protested mobbings and tar-
and-featherings. "Free speech," Helper wrote, "is considered as 
treason against slavery: and when people dare neither speak nor 
print their thoughts, free thought itself is well nigh extin-
guished."31 "Give us fair play," Helper insisted, "secure to us the 
right of discussion, the freedom of speech, and we will settle the 
difficulty at the ballot box, not on the battleground-by force of 
reason, not force of arms."32 But, he suggested, if slaveholders 
insisted on violence, non-slaveholders and slaves-quite willing 
to cut their masters throats-far outnumbered the "lords of the 
lash."33 
When Congress convened in 1859, Southerners and Demo-
crats branded Republicans who endorsed Helper's book as 
criminals and the book itself as the blueprint for the infamous 
John Brown raid. The critics warned that the book had a very 
bad tendency-it was incendiary. Republicans could not apply 
the spark and express astonishment at the explosion. Southern 
Congressmen announced that, like John Brown, Republican en-
dorsers should be hung.34 
Republicans made free speech a centerpiece of their polit-
ical program. Their 1856 campaign slogan was "Free Speech, 
29. Hinton Rowan Helper, The Impending Crisis of the South: How to Meet It 
(George M. Fredrickson ed., Harv. U. Press, 1968) (1857) ("Impending Crisis"). 
30. Curtis, 68 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 1141-44 (cited in note 12). 
31. Helper, Impending Crisis at 409 (cited in note 29). 
32. Id. at 149. 
33. Id. 
34. See generally Curtis, 68 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 1144-47 (cited in note 12), a part of 
the Symposium on the Law of Slavery. 
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Free Press, Free Men, Free Labor, Free Territory, and 
Fremont. "3s So it was natural that Republicans responded to the 
Democratic attack by invoking freedom of speech. Senator Wil-
son of Massachusetts said, "[I]n Massachusetts we have absolute 
freedom of speech and of the press. We deal with all public ques-
tions, all social questions, all questions that concern the human 
race. We have nothing there that prevents the fullest and boldest 
discussion .... " Southerners could go there and advocate slav-
ery and be "listened to in peace."36 Senator Seward contended 
that "[t]he theory of our system is, that error of opinion may in 
all cases safely be tolerated where reason is left free to combat 
it. "37 Others insisted that suppression of anti-slavery speech in 
the Southern states violated the sacred guarantees of the Consti-
tution for free speech and press.3s By resolution, Republicans in 
the Senate insisted on free discussion of the morality and expedi-
ency of slavery "and every other subject of domestic and national 
policy. "39 
Meanwhile in North Carolina, a Wesleyan minister who cir-
culated Helper's book was convicted under North Carolina's 
statute banning anti-slavery agitation. The statute explicitly used 
a bad tendency test. For Southerners, books that contributed to 
slave discontent had a bad tendency indeed.40 The Supreme 
Court of North Carolina upheld the conviction. The Court said 
the book was inflammatory and the legislature could assume 
that, though circulated only to whites, its "corrupting influence 
would inevitably reach the black."41 
In response to these events many Republicans in 1859 and 
1860, like abolitionists before them, championed a robust view of 
free speech. They supported this right even for ideas they con-
sidered barbarous and horrible-human slavery and reopening 
the African slave trade. Republican Senator Hale explicitly re-
jected the bad tendency test, and implicitly so did many more. 
They saw suppression of anti-slavery speech as an admission that 
slavery could not survive free debate. (On this point, but for dif-
ferent reasons, Southerners agreed.) Abolitionists, and later 
Republicans on the eve of the Civil War, did not attempt to si-
35. Richard H. Sewell, Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States 
1837-1860 284 (Oxford U. Press, 1976) 
36. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1859). 
37. Id. at 913. 
38. Curtis, 68 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 1155-56 (cited in note 12). 
39. ld. at 1157-58. 
40. Id. at 1164-5. 
41. State v. Worth, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 488, 492 (1860). 
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lence racists and advocates of slavery. They had faith in the cura-
tive power of free discussion. It is a faith that in the closing years 
of the twentieth century seems to many to be naive. 
In the 1866 debates on Reconstruction and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Republicans recounted the suppression of free 
speech in the South. Several leading Republicans suggested that 
the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment 
would force states to respect the Bill of Rights.42 Of course, 
during the Civil War, and over some Republican protests, Abra-
ham Lincoln, to mention one example, did exile a Democratic 
politician for making an anti-war, anti-black, anti-draft speech.43 
Still, Democratic politicians generally went unpunished for much 
racist political propaganda and for many harsh criticisms of Presi-
dent Lincoln. 
After the Civil War, both Congress and the states enacted 
new limits on speech. These included statutes proscribing ob-
scenity, defined to include information about contraception.44 In 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, disseminating infor-
mation about birth control was a crime. 
With the outbreak of World War I, Congress passed legisla-
tion used to suppress anti-war speech.4s The socialist political 
leader, Eugene Debs, was jailed for an anti-war speech.46 
Charles Schenck was jailed for circulating, to recruits and others, 
a leaflet advocating opposition to the draft and suggesting that 
the draft violated the thirteenth amendment's ban against invol-
untary servitude.47 The leaflet did not advocate illegal conduct, 
but that fact did not save Mr. Schenck. The Supreme Court in-
voked the bad tendency of their remarks and upheld convictions 
of anti-war activists. Recollection of Abraham Lincoln's sup-
pression of the anti-war racist speech of Clement Valladigham 
perhaps made the suppression seem more natural. 
Confronted with such suppression of speech, in 1927 in a 
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,48 Justice Louis Bran-
deis drafted what later became some central tenets of modem 
42. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenlh Amendment and the Bill of Right:: 
at 34-91 (cited in note 22); Curtis, 68 Chi. Kent L Rev. at 1174-77 (cited in note 12). 
43. James M. McPherson, Banle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 597-98 (Oxford 
U. Press, 1988}. 
44. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History at 161 (cited in note 11). 
45. E.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919}; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211 (1919); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 842 n.10 (Foundation Press, 
2d ed. 1988). 
46. Debs, 249 U.S. 211. 
47. Schenck, 249 U.S. 47. 
48. Whimey v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring.) 
1995] FREE SPEECH 41 
free speech doctrine. Brandeis's doctrine substantially extended 
protection for free expression. Though today some leading advo-
cates of free speech revision have explicitly rejected Brandeis's 
approach,49 it is worth quoting him at some length. "Those who 
won our independence," he said, "believed that freedom to think 
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to 
the discovery and spread of political truth," and "that without 
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile." Believing 
in the power of reason 
they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force 
in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of gov-
erning majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free 
speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of 
free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt wo-
men. It is the function of speech to free men from the bond-
age of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech 
there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will 
result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable 
ground to believe that the danger is imminent. There must be 
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a 
serious one .... [E]ven advocacy of [law] violation, however 
reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free 
speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there 
is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately 
acted on. 
Those who won our independence by revolution were not 
cowards .... To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence 
in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through 
the process of popular government, no danger flowing from 
speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence 
of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall 
before there is opportunity for full discussion.so 
49. MacKinnon, Only Words at 103-04 (cited in note 1); see There's No Such Thing 
As Free Speech at 126-27 (cited in note 1) (citing with approval the test in United States v. 
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) whether the gravity of the evil discounted by its 
improbability justifies such invasion of free speech; the lower court found the Communist 
threat outweighed the interest in free speech). Although Fish asserts that such an ad hoc 
balancing test will not always result in suppression, the record is not encouraging. Not 
only did free speech lose in the Communist case he cites, but the interest in national 
survival outweighed the free speech interest and so justified expelling Jehovah Witness 
children from school for refusing to salute the flag. Compare Minersville School Dist. v. 
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) with West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). See Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 Yale LJ. 1424 
(1962). See generally, Michael Kent Curtis, ed., The Constitution and the Flag: The Flag 
Salute Cases (Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993). 
50. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring.) 
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Following the path blazed by Justice Brandeis, in the 1930s 
and 1940s the Court expanded protection for speech. In the 
1950s the Court did depart from the Brandeis rationale and up-
hold convictions under the Smith Act for advocacy of overthrow 
of the government by force and violence at some undetermined 
later date.s1 Around the same time, it upheld an Illinois group 
libellaw.sz But later decisions substantially extended protection 
even for speech advocating forcible overthrow of the govem-
ment.sJ From the 1930s through the 1960s (with substantial 
backsliding in the 1950s), free speech protection was given to 
those who opposed powerful and entrenched local and national 
interests. Those protected included labor organizers, advocates 
of integration, and opponents of the draft and the war in Viet-
nam.s4 At the same time the Court protected speech by racists.ss 
The Court applied its precedents uniformly. A decision pro-
tecting a civil rights demonstration in Columbia, South Carolina 
cited a case protecting speech by a racist in Chicago.s6 In 1969, 
the Court overturned the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader on 
a basis resembling Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in 
Whitney v. California. The Klansman had said that if the Presi-
dent, the Congress, and the Supreme Court continued to oppress 
the white race, "there might have to be some revengance taken." 
He claimed "the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew 
returned to Israel. "s7 The per curiam decision reversing the con-
viction was written by Justice Fortas, and was joined by Justice 
Marshall, a heroic figure in the civil rights movement and the 
Court's first black Justice. 
II. CURRENT CRITICISMS OF THE MODERN IDEA OF 
FREE SPEECH 
A. REVIVAL OF THE BAD TENDENCY TEST 
Some critics of modem free speech doctrine reject Justice 
Brandeis's premises in order to eliminate obstacles to regulation 
they find desirable-from regulation of non-obscene sexual rna-
51. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
52. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
53. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 
(1961). 
54. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 37 
U.S. 229 (1963); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
55. Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969). 
56. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. at 238, citing Terminiello, 337 U.S. 1. 
57. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446-47. 
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terial defined as "pornography" to group libel laws and regula-
tion of hate speech and speech that creates "a hostile learning 
environment." What is remarkable is not simply that reformers 
advocate specific additional exceptions, but that in the interest of 
broad and vague exceptions, some repudiate so much core free 
speech doctrine. Of course, criticism of the modem idea of free 
speech is not limited to those on the left. Criticisms of Justice 
Brandeis's doctrine were also espoused in the early work of Rob-
ert Bork.ss 
Brandeis suggested that fear of serious injury alone was in-
sufficient to justify suppression. "What," Catharine MacKinnon 
asks rhetorically, "has to be added to fear of serious injury to 
justify doing something about the speech that causes it?"s9 
Surely, she implies, that should be enough. In effect, such an ap-
proach revives the bad tendency test. Before modem free speech 
doctrine, some courts had treated a finding that speech had a bad 
tendency to cause evil results as a sufficient basis to justify sup-
pression. Brandeis replaced this test with a more protective 
"clear and present danger" requirement. 
The Brandeis rule depends on a corollary without which 
much of the difference between the Brandeis test and the bad 
tendency test would disappear. The Court has refused broadly to 
find the fact that speech (not focused on a particular individual) 
that causes "hurt feelings, offense, or resentment" is sufficient to 
strip the speech of constitutional protection.60 If such conse-
quences were regarded as a sufficient injury, much, though by no 
means all, of the expression Professor MacKinnon would like to 
reach could be suppressed. So could abolitionist criticism of 
slaveholders, jokes about political figures, flag burning, wearing 
"Fuck the Draft" on one's jacket, and a lot more. 
Professor MacKinnon has attempted to look at speech at a 
new conceptual level. While first amendment doctrine focuses 
on what speech says-what ideas are expressed-and offers 
broad protection for ideas, she insists on looking at what speech 
does-at its effects, including its emotional effects and what she 
claims are its effects on power and subordination. Tendency to 
58. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
Ind. LJ. 1, 23-25 (1971). 
59. MacKinnon, Only Words at 104 (cited in note 1). 
60. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2559 (1992) (White, J., concurring). 
Justice White cited Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988) Cohen v. Califomiil, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 
576, 592 (1969); and Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). For a case involving a 
hostile work environment, see Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). 
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produce bad effects, she implies, justifies suppression. This is a 
very old conception, not a new one. 
Suppression of speech has almost always been based not on 
concern about what is said, but on concern about effects. The 
Southern elite insisted on suppressing anti-slavery speech be-
cause of concern about effects-slave revolts and civil war. 
Northerners who advocated suppression similarly were con-
cerned about effects. If fear of the evil effect of speech justifies 
suppression, the violators of the Sedition Act, the critics of slav-
ery in the South, and the opponents of World War I and the draft 
were all appropriately convicted. In each case the motive for 
suppression was fear of evil effects. In each case, from the per-
spective of the times, there were serious grounds for fear. Today 
Professor MacKinnon dismisses fear of domestic Communism in 
the 1950s as "paranoid," but it did not seem so to the decision 
makers at the time. To a future critic, some of Professor MacK-
innon's fears may seem as baseless as the fear of Communism in 
the 1950s now seems to her. At any rate, the "new" focus on 
effects of speech-on fear of bad effects-is not simply a matter 
of adjusting the thermostat in the house of free speech doctrine. 
It is burning the house down to roast the pig. 
Professor MacKinnon virtually endorses the bad tendency 
test. She warns that the rejection of the bad tendency test and 
other aspects of current doctrine-viewpoint neutrality, counter 
speech as the preferred remedy for evil ideas, and the view that 
"there is no such thing as a false idea"- are being adhered to 
with "fundamentalist zeal."6t Free speech, Professor MacKin-
non announces, now protects Nazis, Klansmen, and 
pornographers while doing nothing for their victims.62 Of 
course, in recent history, at the same time it protected freedom 
61. MacKinnon, Only Words at 76-77 (cited in note 1). 
62. Id. at 109. Of course, the Frrst Amendment continues to protect minorities who 
are not Nazis, Klansmen, or "pornographers." E.g., Koser v. County of Price, 834 F. 
Supp. 305 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (protection of Indians arrested for displaying an American 
flag on which a picture of a Plains Indian had been superimposed); Gay and Lesbian 
Services Network, Inc. v. Bishop, 832 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (protection of right of 
gays and lesbians to parade). The question of legal protection accorded to the wicked is a 
complex one, but one of its many facets has been captured by Robert Bolt: 
Roper: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law! 
Thomas More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to 
get after the Devil? 
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that! 
Thomas More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 
round on you-where would you hide Roper, the laws all being flat? ... [D)'you 
really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd 
give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake. 
Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons 66 (Random House, 1960). 
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marchers in the South, advocates of homosexuality, and oppo-
nents of the war in Vietnam, free speech doctrine was also pro-
tecting "Nazis, Klansmen, and [at least some] pornographers." 
The practical effect of Professor MacKinnon's rejection of 
much basic free speech doctrine is unclear because her argument 
is qualified in curious and seemingly contradictory ways. Some-
times she distinguishes racist speech from pornography, seem-
ingly allowing more protection for racist speech.63 Claims of 
inferiority based on group membership, she tells us, can be de-
bated and expressed. But "social inferiority cannot be imposed 
through any means, including expressive ones."64 What these 
statements mean, the reader can explore by reading her book, 
Only Words. What does come through, loud and clear, is hostil-
ity to the traditional idea of free speech, with no workable doc-
trine to replace it. 
B. GROUP LIBEL 
Whatever one thinks of Professor MacKinnon's free speech 
analysis, there is no doubt about the dangers currently posed by 
prejudice based on group membership and its exploitation for 
political purposes. So it is hardly surprising that some believe 
that the state should be able to punish libel of groups as well as 
libel of individuals.6s These critics conclude that the 1952 
Supreme Court case of Beauharnais v. Illinois was correctly de-
cided after all.66 
Beauharnais objected to the movement of black families 
into his Chicago neighborhood, so he prepared a petition to the 
city council, sponsored by his White Circle League. The petition 
called on "[o]ne million self respecting white people in Chicago 
to unite .... If persuasion and the need to prevent the white race 
from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then 
the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana, 
of the negro surely will. "67 Beauharnais was punished under an 
Illinois law that made it criminal to assert the "depravity, crimi-
nality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any 
63. MacKinnon, Only Words at 62-63 (cited in note 1 ). 
64. Id. at 106. 
65. E.g., Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 
682 (1988). 
66. MacKinnon, Only Words at 81-86 (cited in note 1). 
67. Beauhamais, 343 U.S. at 252. Beauharnais was asking the city counsel to do 
something that was beyond its constitutional power even in the Plessy era. In 1917 the 
Supreme Court held municipal segregation of neighborhoods by race violated the Four· 
teenth Amendment. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See also the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. 
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race, color, creed or religion" and to expose them to "contempt, 
derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the 
peace or riots."68 
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a bare majority of the 
Court, upheld the statute, using a standard of great deference to 
the judgement of the legislature. 
[I]f [a libelous] utterance directed at an individual may be the 
object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power 
to punish the same utterance directed at a defined group, un-
less we can say that this is a wilful and purposeless restriction 
unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State.69 
In short, a plausible legislative belief that group defamation 
tended to produce evil consequences was sufficient to justify leg-
islative suppression. Because libel is not protected speech, 
Frankfurter said, Justice Brandeis's clear and present danger test 
was inapplicable.1o 
At trial, Beauharnais had attempted to prove that his claim 
of criminal propensities was true. This he was not permitted to 
do, based on his failure to satisfy the court that he acted for good 
motives and justifiable ends.n There is indeed something deeply 
repugnant about allowing a jury to find such generalizations 
about groups to be "true." One evil of generalization is that it 
ignores individuals and treats all as having negative characteris-
tics possessed by some. All groups contain members with nega-
tive characteristics. By contrast, in individual libel actions, truth 
is now a constitutional defense.n 
In 1965, Professor Harry Kalven of the University of Chi-
cago Law School noted that the civil rights movement had not 
sought to advance its goals by group libel laws. Kalven wrote 
celebrating the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan.13 There 
the Court announced the central core of its approach to free 
speech: debate on public issues was to be robust, uninhibited, 
and wide open.74 Because of its broad protection for political 
speech, New York Times has been treated as banning most group 
68. 343 U.S. at 251. 
69. 343 U.S. at 258. 
70. 343 U.S. at 266. 
71. 343 U.S. at 265. 
72. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
73. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment 7-64 (U. of Chi. Press, 
1965). 
74. New York Tunes v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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libellaws.1s The gains made to date by the Civil Rights Move-
ment and most of the gains made by the Women's Movement 
were made without restricting free speech doctrine. 
C. THE IssuE oF NEUTRALITY 
Although advocates of revision often have kind words for 
group libel laws, they are unwilling to apply such ideas across the 
board. Indeed, rejection of neutral standards is a characteristic 
of many calls to revise free speech doctrine. 
Professor MacKinnon, for example, explains that in crafting 
free speech rules we can and should distinguish between the op-
pressor and the oppressed.76 Professor Matsuda attempts to 
draft an exception for hateful racist speech. But she also rejects 
neutral application. Professor Matsuda would suppress hateful 
speech by individuals who are members of dominant groups, but 
not hateful speech directed at dominant groups by non-dominant 
ones.11 Blacks could usually indulge in hate speech directed at 
whites, but not the other way around. Similarly, she would pro-
tect the speech of Communists, but not Nazis.1s 
In part Professor Matsuda justifies the different treatment of 
Communists and Fascists by noting the existence of a substantial 
number of Communist nations, but not Fascist ones.79 She sees 
Communism, apparently, as simply part of the international com-
munity. Subsequent events have somewhat undermined this dis-
tinction, but did it ever make sense? If, as appears possible, we 
face a resurgence of Fascism, would that add legitimacy to Fascist 
speech? At any rate, both Communist and Fascist speech can 
have bad tendencies, and once in power the ideologies can pro-
duce hideous results, as the Holocaust and the killing of millions 
of people based on economic class in the Soviet Union, Cambo-
dia, and North Vietnam demonstrate. Indeed the history of 
China during the Cultural Revolution, of the Soviet Union under 
Stalin, of Cambodia under Pol Pot, and of North Vietnam show 
that atrocities can be committed in the name of equality.so Lack 
of free speech left such policies unhindered by criticism and unal-
tered by criticism. 
75. Compare id. with American Booksellers Assoc., Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th 
Cir. 1985) and Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
76. MacKinnon, Only Words at 80-86 (cited in note 1). 
77. Matsuda, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2358 (cited in note 1). 
78. ld. at 2359. 
79. Id. at 2359-60. 
80. E.g., The Ho"ors of Mao: The cost of his vision may have been 80 million Chi-
nese lives, The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, Aug. 1-7 1994, at 6-9. 
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If applied across the board, group libel laws could silence 
the champions of the oppressed. If it were criminal libel to por-
tray lack of virtue in any class of citizens, much political speech 
could be silenced. The economically or politically dominant 
could not be criticized for pursuing selfish ends to the injury of 
others, because that would suggest lack of virtue and hold them 
up to contempt. 
Under the standard set in the Illinois group libel law applied 
in Beauharnais, the founding document of the women's rights 
movement, the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments of 1848, 
could be subject to criminal sanction. "The history of mankind is 
a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man 
toward woman," the Declaration announced, "having in direct 
object the establishment of absolute tyranny over her. "st Since, 
according to the Seneca Falls Declaration, men had oppressed 
women and had done so for an evil motive-establishment of 
absolute tyranny-the Declaration suggests lack of virtue in 
men. Some modem feminist writing might also be read as de-
faming men as a group.s2 
The Seneca Falls Declaration is correct at least in so far as it 
alleges a history of repeated injuries and usurpations of many 
men toward women. But Beauharnais held that truth may not 
be a defense, at least unless the court finds the motives good and 
the ends justifiable. If there had been a trial of the authors of the 
Seneca Declaration, the men making the decision in 1848 likely 
would have found the Seneca Falls Declaration was not made for 
"good motives and justifiable ends." Those in power tend to sus-
pect the motives and ends of their critics. 
It is natural to try to design the boomerang so that it will not 
strike the thrower in this way. So Professor MacKinnon suggests 
that the rationale of the New York Times decision restricting libel 
in the interest of free speech on political subjects was a mistake. 
The line should be drawn between the oppressor and the op-
pressed. The principle should be that the ad protesting imprison-
ment of Martin Luther King was protected not because of 
broadly applicable principles of free speech, but because the ad 
promoted equality.s3 By such theories, no doubt, the Declara-
tion of Sentiments could be protected because the defamed 
81. Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions (1848), reprinted in Ste-
phen B. Presser and Jamil S. Zainaldin, Law and Jurisprudence in American History: 
Cases and Materials 553-54 (West Pub. Co., 2d ed. 1989) 
82. Cf. Douglas Laycock, VICious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 Const. Comm. 395 
(1991). 
83. MacKinnon, Only Words at 80-86 (cited in note 1). 
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group was made up of men, a group some (with remarkable over-
simplification) may see as homogenous and dominant.84 
D. THE CALL FOR GREATER JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Some critics of current doctrine call explicitly for more dis-
cretion. Stanley Fish, for example, suggests that ad hoc balancing 
of interests should replace the more categorical approach to free 
speech protection often followed by the Court.ss Professor Fish 
cites with approval U.S. v. Dennis86 and suggests asking whether 
"the gravity of the evil discounted by its improbability justifies 
such invasions of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger." His approving citation of a case in which the court found 
the unlikely danger of communist revolution in the indefinite fu-
ture sufficient to overcome the interest in free speech tells us a 
good deal about how Professor Fish's test works. Ad hoc balanc-
ing produced decisions that approved jailing of Jehovah Witness 
children for their refusal to salute the ftag.B7 There is also little 
doubt as to how Professor Fish's test would have worked for abo-
litionist speech. The danger of civil war was as grave and more 
likely than the threat of communist revolution. Indeed, one 
Southern newspaper explicitly suggested a balancing test. 
Instead of categorical rules devised in advance, Professor 
Fish advocates "considering each situation as it emerges," bal-
ancing "risks and gains. "ss The problem, of course, is that in the 
midst of crisis this ad hoc balancing often balances in favor of 
suppression. Though Fish acknowledges the benefits of a "proce-
dure that requires you to jump through hoops-do a lot of argu-
mentative work-before a speech regulation will be allowed to 
stand,"s9 he seems not to recognize that ad hoc decision making 
removes most of the hoops, leaving only a very large one which, 
historically, has been traversed with ease in times of crisis. Pro-
tecting "dangerous" speech is easier for the judge to explain on 
the basis of predetermined categories, rather than by announcing 
84. Seeing all "men" as dominant is oversimple because it ignores class, social sta-
tus, sexual orientation, race, and psychological type. 
85. Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech at 127 (cited in note 1). For an 
example of the categorical approach see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
86. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). For another citation of the case with approval, see 
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuan, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976). In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 
409-10, 418, the Court used the Brandenburg test. 
87. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In reversing Minersville, 
the Court followed a more categorical approach. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
88. Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech at 111 (cited in note 1). 
89. ld. at 113·14. 
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that, on balance, she or he thought protection best. Categorical 
protection of speech tends to check the natural tendency of the 
judge to see the problem through the lens of the hysteria of the 
moment and of the larger society. 
E. SLIPPERY SLOPES 
Critics of modern free speech doctrine denigrate it as based 
on the "slippery slope:" 
[I]f we restrict this bad thing now, we will not be able to stop 
ourselves from restricting this good thing later. One corollary 
is that everyone has an interest in everyone else's speech being 
free, because restriction will get around to you eventually; the 
less power you have the sooner it will get around to you."90 
Professor MacKinnon apparently believes stating the proposition 
in this way goes a long way toward showing its absurdity. 
Although it is currently fashionable to denigrate the "slip-
pery slope," sociologists and psychologists do suggest that it is 
easier to persuade people ultimately to engage in actions they 
would otherwise reject by gradual and initially appealing steps. 
So there may indeed be a sense in which accepting censorship in 
a more appealing situation makes the next step easier.9t There is 
psychological support for the corollary that we all have an inter-
est in free speech because repression tends to spread. 
Critics of current doctrine question whether initially attrac-
tive exceptions tend to breed less desirable ones. But some of 
these critics denigrate the concept of the slippery slope of sup-
pression even as they themselves are sliding down it. Professor 
Matsuda starts by banning racist hate speech, seemingly includ-
ing political speech. She ends up apparently banning Mark 
Twain's Huckleberry Finn from schools to protect the sensitivities 
of black students from a book that uses the word "nigger." She 
reaches this result even though she forthrightly acknowledges 
that the book is both a literary classic and an indictment of ra-
cism.92 Her view is particularly ironic because Huckleberry Finn 
90. MacKinnon, Only Words at 76 (cited in note 1). 
91. Sutherland, Irrationality: The Enemy Within 96-98 (cited in note 7); Amitai Et-
zioni, The Spirit of Community 175-77, 192-206 (Crown Publishers, 1993) (pointing out 
both the tendency toward sliding down slippery slopes when tradition is changed, that 
such a slide it not inevitable, and asserting that very careful notching principles can help 
avoid the slide). 
92. Matsuda, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2369 (cited in note 1). Because selection of school 
books is a much more complex problem than making sale of the book criminal, removal 
of the book from the school because of content may not be impermissible government 
censorship. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arlwnsas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (Black, J. concur-
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is a book about moral transformation in the direction of Mat-
suda's and my own values. Human contact between Huck and 
the slave Jim leads Huck to reject the rules of a slave society. To 
understand the dimensions of Huck's moral transformation, one 
has to understand the society in which he lives. That, of course, 
is what the references to "niggers" are about. Can we hope for 
moral transformation in a society that "protects" young people 
from the story because of the negative effect of the word? 
One reason for clear, strong, narrow, and precise first 
amendment doctrine is to prevent the slide into dangerous sup-
pression of speech.93 It is just such precision that some critics-
willing to ban speech with a bad tendency to produce evil results, 
to resort to ad hoc decision making, and to allow censorship of 
"pornography" which has serious literary, artistic, or political 
value-fail to provide. 
Professor MacKinnon, for example, fails to explain how to 
prevent the slide. Instead she seems ready to revive the bad ten-
dency test and she blurs current understanding of the distinction 
between protected speech and suppressible action. She wants to 
remove the protection for sexually explicit works with serious 
value, but provides us little guidance as to where the suppression 
would end.94 
ring); but see Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). Just as constitutional 
protection of speech should not be confused with its acceptability, some violations of the 
idea of free speech may be wrong, but inappropriate for judicial resolution. 
93. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 366,370-71 (1985). 
Schauer distinguishes problems of excess breadth from the slippery slope argument. As 
he points out vagueness in the principle asserted to reach a desirable result increases the 
danger of sliding from desirable to dangerous regulation. The same observation seems to 
apply to excess breadth, though Schauer treats that problem as analytically distinct, per-
haps because it seems capable of easier solution. For a thoughtful effort to craft a rule 
protecting both speech and some victims of hostile and threatening expression, see Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 Harv. 
L. Rev. 124, 160 n.187 (1992). Professor Amar's proposed ordinance, based on the Thir-
teenth Amendment would protect racist political speech in a public forum. In my view, 
however, partly because many victims of harassing and threatening conduct do not fit well 
in the "slavery" category, a general First Amendment rule is preferable to one based on 
the Thirteenth Amendment. 
94. MacKinnon, Only Words at 88 (cited in note 1). On words and action, see 
Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917): 
Political agitation, by the passions it arouses or the convictions it engenders, may 
in fact stimulate men to the violation of the law. Detestation of existing policies 
is easily transformed into forcible resistance of the authority which puts them in 
execution, and it would be folly to disregard the causal relation between the two. 
Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent 
res!sta!lce• is to disre~ard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation 
wh1ch m normal times IS a safeguard of free government. The distinction is not a 
scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for freedom .... 
Id. at 540 
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Current obscenity law at least attempts to draw a line. Vrr-
tually any pornography, Professor MacKinnon laments, has 
"value." Of course, the current test requires "serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value."9s Far from finding everything 
has serious value, as Professor MacKinnon's readers might infer, 
the courts and many juries have found the formula allows the 
suppression of much if not most sexually explicit material. Since 
the decision in Miller, out of fifty-nine cases making a finding on 
the issue of obscenity, the federal and state appellate courts pro-
tected material as having serious value only five times.% 
Still the formula (together with the requirement that the 
work be judged in its entirety) does protect those like Professor 
MacKinnon who include material that otherwise might meet the 
test of obscenity in their work.97 Professor MacKinnon would 
respond, of course, that her work should be protected because it 
fosters equality or furthers the cause of the oppressed. While its 
political content is apparent, whether ideas like those in Only 
Words do in fact further equality or advance the cause of the 
oppressed is a much more difficult question.9s 
Robust rules against suppression of speech because of its 
point of view or bad tendency are essential guarantees of individ-
ual and political freedom. Thoughtful arguments for revision 
would recognize that departures from these rules involve serious 
dangers and that exceptions need to be confined by tough, nar-
rowly drawn, and very careful rules. As the problem of photo-
graphs of children engaging in sexual activity shows, that does 
not mean new exceptions (if very carefully and narrowly drawn) 
are never appropriate. But good purposes alone are not enough. 
The road to Hell is paved with good intentions. 
Consider, for example, the complaints about abuses under 
campus codes prohibiting conduct "creating a hostile learning en-
95. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
96. These figures are rough, based on a survey of cases in the West Digest. Miller is 
an attempt to provide protection for first amendment values while allowing suppression 
of much sexually explicit expression. Privacy interests should justify suppression of 
graphic sexual material whose circulation occurs without the consent, or capacity to con-
sent, of persons pictured. 
97. MacKinnon, Only Words at 133 n.48 (cited in note 1); Kaplan v. California, 413 
U.S. 115 {1973) (holding a book with only text (no pictures) can be obscene). For a book 
using graphic sexual material to illustrate sexual subordination of women in ancient 
Greece, see Eva C. Keuls, The Reign of the Phallus: Sexual Politics in Ancient Athens 
(Harper & Row, 1985). 
98. See Nan D. Hunter and Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-
Censorship Taskforce, et aL, in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. Mich. 
J. L. Reform 69 (1987-88); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Ex-
pression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. 95, 134-49. 
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vironment. "99 This standard is extraordinarily vague when ap-
plied to classroom readings and discussion and to interchange in 
dormitories.too Leading intellectuals have suggested that abuses 
under these standards are serious indeed. For example, Profes-
sor Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, a founder of the Women's Studies 
Program at Emory University, says: 
The sex and discriminatory harassment codes have con-
structed a web of impossible actions and utterances that multi-
ply with each passing day. This is a Kafkaesque world in 
which, more often than not, you do not know the rules until 
you have violated them.tot 
She reports that most professors in Southern studies fear to teach 
The Clansman, one of the most "effective ways to convey the 
quality of early 20th-century racism."l02 
At the University of Minnesota College, Republicans were 
barred from handing out flyers at their booth at a freshman ori-
entation fair. The flyers contained tasteless jokes and mean-spir-
ited comments about President and Mrs. Clinton and the Clinton 
administration's sexual orientation policy. The University found 
the flyers violated the campus non-discrimination policy because 
they were not respectful of diversity.to3 At Chicago Theological 
Seminary, a 63-year-old Professor used a story from the Talmud 
in class to illustrate ideas about sin and state of mind. The semi-
nary found classroom use of the story "verbal conduct of a sexual 
nature" that created "an intimidating, hostile or offensive" envi-
ronment. As reported by the New York Tunes: 
In a discussion of the role of intent in sin, [the Professor] re-
cited a story from the Talmud, the writings that make up Jew-
99. Cf., e.g., The First Amendment, Under Fire From the Left, New York Times Mag-
azine, Mar. 13, 1994, at 41, 44. 
100. For an interesting essay on the problem, see William Van Alstyne, The Univer-
sity in the Manner of TUlllllnmen Square, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1 (1993). 
101. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Political correctness stifles thought and speech, News & 
Record (Greensboro, N.C.), May 1, 1994, at Fl. 
102. Id. 
103. David P. Bryden, Campus Free Speech Fiasco, 2 Minn. Scholar 9 (1994). Exam-
ples of the jokes and statements include the following: 
and 
Reporter: Mr. President, now that you are elected, what do you really think 
about Roe v. Wade? Slick Willie: I really don't care how the Haitians get 
home." 
Q. What happened when Bill Clinton got a shot of testosterone? 
A. He turned into Hillary. 
David Bryden also reports that the flyers mocked the Administrations's sexual orienta-
tion policies. "A mock tax form listed categories for 'married homosexual filing separate 
returns' and 'married inter-species filing jointly.'" 
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ish civil and religious law, about a man who falls off a roof, 
lands on a woman and accidentally has intercourse with her. 
The Talmud says he is innocent of sin, since the act was 
unintentional.104 
Some advocates of revision insist that they cannot be held 
responsible for abuses under the standards they advocate. We 
know that the current first amendment "ideology" limits such 
abuses. Those who advocate different standards might explain 
how the standards they propose will avoid similar abuse. Alter-
natively, they might explain why suppression of discussion of af-
firmative action or of racist speech in American history should 
not be a matter of concern. Courts have properly held that hos-
tile, threatening, and coercive speech that is aimed at an individ-
ual is not constitutionally protected. So the need to deter such 
conduct does not require broader rules. 
F. THE CRITICISMS IN LIGHT OF HISTORY 
An historical perspective also suggests that there is much to 
be said for the corollary that those with less power who advocate 
change do need the protection of free speech. According to Pro-
fessor MacKinnon, American understanding of free speech was 
largely shaped by McCarthy era attempts to restrict Communist 
speech in the 1950s. The effect of this experience, she suggests, 
provides much of the current rationale for free speech ideol-
ogy_tos The reader might infer that the experience of the 1950s is 
a narrow basis for justifying a doctrine. Justice Brandeis, of 
course, wrote well before the 1950s so it is likely that he was 
thinking of a longer history and a more pervasive pattern. At 
any rate, Professor MacKinnon says the doctrinal edifice con-
structed by the Court is unsuccessful. It has failed to guarantee 
"free and equal" speech.106 
In fact, of course, the history of free speech is far more ex-
tensive than that of the McCarthy era. And while this history 
cannot tell us what to do, it may at least broaden our perspective 
and give us a larger context for evaluation. It shows how doc-
trines like the bad tendency test have been used in the past. In 
doing so, it shows why courts have become leery of the bad ten-
dency test. 
104. Dirk Johnson, A Sexual Harassment Case to Test Academic Freedom, N.Y. 
Times, May 11, 1994, at 023. 
105. MacKinnon, Only Words at 74-77 (cited in note 1). 
106. Id. at n. For an article focusing both on the problem of threatening racist 
speech and the history of liberty, see Amar, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 151-57 (cited in note 93). 
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At critical times, broad ideas of free speech have provided 
support or protection for progressive political dissidents. Depar-
tures from those ideas have provided rationales for suppression. 
One thing we see from looking at history is that what Profes-
sor MacKinnon calls "paranoid" attempts "to shut up"t07 people 
are hardly limited to the McCarthy era. But the more deeply one 
understands the times, the better one can understand the plausi-
bility of fears that led to suppression. At the time they are ex-
pressed, these fears always look powerful and compelling. It was 
for this reason that Justice Brandeis was loath to justify suppres-
sion based on fear of serious injury or the simple bad tendency of 
speech. 
The prosecutions under the Sedition Act of 1798, for exam-
ple, were based on fear of serious injury from the bad tendency 
of criticisms of governmental officials. "If a man attempts to de-
stroy the confidence of the people in their officers, their supreme 
magistrate, and their legislature, he effectually saps the founda-
tion of the government," Justice Samuel Chase warned a Sedition 
Act jury.tos His view accorded with an English decision holding 
that if government had a bad reputation, it could not subsist-a 
great evil indeed.t09 At this early stage in the history of the Re-
public, concerns about the instability of government had a cer-
tain plausibility. 
Later in American history, the bad tendency test was in-
voked to justify suppression of anti-slavery speech. It was also 
used to justify punishing a newspaper for criticizing an outra-
geously anti-democratic state supreme court decision in favor of 
a powerful utility monopoly. Among other things the state court 
had found a constitutional amendment allowing home rule (and 
public power) for Denver to be unconstitutional!Ho The bad ten-
dency test was also used to justify punishing members of the So-
cialist Party for parading with a red fl.ag,11t to punish publishers 
of a nudist newspaper that advocated a boycott of the "prudes" 
1Q7. MacKinnon, Only Words at 75 (cited in note 1). 
108. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 639 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865). 
109. R. v. Tutchin (1804), quoted in 2 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the 
Criminal Law of England 318 (Macmillan and Co., 1883). For one view of First Amend-
ment history, see Michael Kent Curtis, Reading the First Amendment by the Light of the 
Burning Flag, in 1 The Constitution and the Flag: The Flag Salute Cases at xix (cited in 
note 49). 
110. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
111. Commonwealth v. Karvonen, 106 N.E. 556, 557 (Mass. 1914). 
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who insisted on prosecution of their nudist colony, and to punish 
opponents of World War I and of the draft.t12 
The proponents of restricting free speech doctrine today 
may believe they have a ready answer to the history of attempts 
to suppress anti-slavery speech. They may argue that anti-slavery 
speech should have been protected, but not because of a broad 
theory of free speech like that endorsed by abolitionists and later 
by leading Republicans. Instead, they might say it should have 
been protected because it supported equality or the cause of the 
oppressed. The problem with this argument is that historically 
their approach-protect abolitionist speech because it is good or 
advocates equality-would never have worked. 
The crucial test came over demands that Northern legisla-
tures pass laws suppressing abolitionist speech and associations. 
In the end the North refused to pass these laws, even though 
abolitionists were quite unpopular and support for equality for 
blacks was slim indeed. The effort failed because many held a 
belief in broad free speech for discussion of public issues, a belief 
often ahead of the law from the courts. Although many con-
ceded that abolitionist speech had bad tendencies, and most 
seemed to think the nation would be much better off without it, 
they feared that the precedent of suppressing abolitionist speech 
would inevitably spread. In the language of today's critics, they 
could be ridiculed as embracing the idea of the slippery slope. 
There is a more sympathetic way of understanding their con-
cerns. Northerners were unwilling to trust suppression of speech 
to doctrines increasing the discretion of public officials for fear 
that this discretion would be abused.H3 
The effort of 1835-36 to suppress abolitionist speech didn't 
fail in the North because of judicial decisions and certainly not 
because abolitionist speech was seen as worthy. Instead it failed 
because of a consensus that suppression of political speech with 
bad tendencies was too dangerous to undertake. Had the public 
been convinced that such scruples were foolish, the widespread 
distaste for abolitionists, together with the conviction that aboli-
tionist doctrines were dangerous indeed, would probably have 
resulted in suppression.H4 
Professor Fish announces that free speech is "just the name 
we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we 
112. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 276-277 (1915); see Schenck, 249 U.S. 47; Debs, 
249 u.s. 211. 
113. Michael Kent Curtis, 89 Nw. U. L Rev. at- (cited in note 22). 
114. ld. 
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wish to advance .... "115 It is hard to be sure just what Professor 
Fish means here. Surely he is not suggesting that Justices Fortas 
and Marshall, for example, labeled the speech of Klansmen "free 
speech" because they wished to advance the Klan agenda. Per-
haps he only means that they favored broad protection of free 
speech (even for Klansmen) because they believed such broad 
and neutral protection essential to protection of progressive so-
cial ideas. But if so, then free speech doctrine becomes some-
thing more than a quest for narrow political advantage. It 
becomes a framework for decisions as opposed to a system pro-
ducing only a favored outcome. In that way free speech is like 
democracy. 
Professor Fish concludes his essay on the non-existence of 
free speech with morally neutral advice about rhetoric. Contest 
the relevance of free speech principles fashioned by your enemy, 
"but if you manage to refashion [free speech ideas] in line with 
your purposes, urge them with a vengeance. "116 To the extent 
that Professor Fish convinces the public or lawyers that free 
speech is "merely the name given to political agendas we wish to 
advance," then the persuasive power of free speech doctrine will 
shrivel and die. Urging free speech ideas "with a vengeance" 
only when it suits your purposes, as Professor Fish recommends, 
fails in the end. It is hard simultaneously to expose free speech 
as nothing more than politics advancing a narrow partisan 
agenda and to expect invocation of free speech to offer you any 
protection-unless your agenda is already quite popular and 
powerful, in which case, of course, you don't need the protection 
of free speech doctrine anyway. 
III. RETHINKING THE CONTROVERSY OVER 
HATEFUL SPEECH 
A. FREE SPEECH AND ABUSES OF POWER 
Of course, as my fourteen-year-old son reminds me, aboli-
tion of slavery is hardly a current topic. Perhaps social progress 
has now reached its pinnacle, though critics of the idea of free 
speech do not seem to think so. If not, we may need space to 
protect the speech of minorities and of those who are too far 
ahead of their times. For women, disfranchised and denied many 
legal rights, free speech has been a prime weapon in the long 
struggle for liberation. The same was true, as the crusade against 
115. Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech at 102 (cited in note 1). 
116. Id. at 114. 
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slavery and the battle for civil rights shows, for Americans of Af-
rican descent. Free speech will not always insure progress, but 
discretion to suppress unorthodox ideas because of their "bad 
tendencies" can facilitate suppression of progressive (as well as 
regressive) ideas. (As we have seen, it is most doubtful that a 
rule to protect only progressive ideas or the interests of 
subordinated groups will work.) Indeed, discretion to suppress 
speech has been abused again, and again, and again. Truth does 
not always conquer falsehood. But it needs at least a fighting 
chance. 
The powerful use governmental and private power in many 
ways to maintain their position. It is human nature to see condi-
tions that protect one's position and advantages as natural and 
just. The pattern of suppression of speech in the interest of privi-
lege is sufficiently pervasive to justify tough prophylactic rules 
against suppression. Those rules do not guarantee that advocacy 
of the interests of the less powerful will succeed. Though neces-
sary, merely preventing suppression may not alone be sufficient. 
But broad theories that permit suppression of ideas in the public 
domain because they have a "bad tendency" can be sufficient to 
stifle progressive change. Suppression can guarantee that advo-
cates for the less powerful will fail. The suppression of the more 
democratic ideas of the Leveller party in England in the seven-
teenth century may not have been required to defeat demands 
for much increased franchise. But it was enough. 
The advocates of first amendment revision have made im-
portant contributions. They have led us to re-examine our as-
sumptions. They have pointed to the real pain inflicted by some 
speech and have reminded us that evil ideas may have evil conse-
quences. They remind us that we are morally responsible for the 
harm our speech causes. They have shown that in the context of 
the school and the job, free speech issues raise difficult problems. 
Because of the role of the school in transmitting basic values, and 
because one of those values is the value of freedom of expression 
and another is equality, free speech issues in schools and colleges 
raise difficult and paradoxical problems. But in their broad re-
jection of basic first amendment ideas, some revisionists under-
state (or ignore) the high price of jettisoning current doctrine and 
ignore the historic justifications for protecting speech. 
However we resolve the troubling and painful issues of ra-
cist speech, sexist speech, hateful speech, and speech that creates 
"a hostile learning environment," we will profit from a broader 
appreciation of the history of free speech in America and the 
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historic function of free speech doctrine. Those in power are al-
ways tempted to suppress speech that threatens their power. Re-
duced protections for speech may give them the means to act on 
that temptation. 
The enactment of campus codes banning a "hostile learning 
environment" shows that at least on the campuses enacting them, 
advocates of the codes have substantial political power. In those 
places, at least, they may be dominant. If one function of free 
speech is to protect against abuses of power-even power exer-
cised for the best purposes-such codes should not be immune 
from very careful first amendment scrutiny. Similarly Professor 
MacKinnon complains that critics of free speech orthodoxy and 
opponents of exploitation of women in pornography remain un-
published.u7 It is a curious claim indeed, especially in a book 
published by the Harvard University Press. 
In any event, a broader focus counsels hesitation in funda-
mentally revising or narrowing existing protections. Free speech 
should protect a broad range of discussion of public issues. Citi-
zen activists, for example, have been confronted with libel suits 
for their complaints to government officials.us Apple growers, 
with some funding from the Chemical Industry, have sued CBS 
for its report on the health risks of Alar.lt9 Monsanto has sued a 
dairy for truthfully stating on its milk label simply that it does not 
use artificial bovine growth hormone)2o Far from adhering with 
"fundamentalist zeal" to the theory that there is no such thing as 
a false idea, as Professor MacKinnon suggests, the Court has de-
parted from it so as to encourage such lawsuits.tzt If large inter-
ests can silence citizen critics, if makers of potentially dangerous 
products can discourage reporting and truthful consumer infor-
mation by suit and threat of suit, then public dialogue on impor-
117. "Those who are hunted down, stigmatized, excluded and unpublished are the 
women who oppose [exploitation of women in pornography.]" MacKinnon, Only Words 
at 104 (cited in note 1). 
118. George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Par-
ticipation" ("SLAPPs"): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders,12 Bridgeport L. 
Rev. 937 (1992). Penelope Canan, Michael Hennessy, and George W. Pring, The Chilling 
Effect of SLAPPS: Legal Risk and Attitudes Toward Political Involvement, 6 Research in 
Political Sociology 347 (1993). 
119. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992). 
120. Marian Burros, The Debate Over Milk and an Artificial Hormone: More Milk, 
More Confusion: What Should the Label Say?, N.Y. Tnnes, May 18, 1994, at Cl. Mon-
santo insists that because the artificial hormone is harmless to people a label saying it is 
absent is misleading. Whether the problems the hormone causes cows lead to increased 
use of anti-biotics that do show up in the milk was not discussed in the Tnnes article. 
121. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co, 497 U.S. 1 (1990), suggests that a statement of 
opinion may be unprotected if it can be read as implying a statement of fact that can be 
proved false. Many statements of opinion might fit this category. 
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tant issues will be impoverished. Important regulatory and 
market checks on abuse of power will disappear. 
Before we decide that the New York Times rule as currently 
applied is too strong, perhaps we should consider whether it is 
sometimes too weak. Before we create a rule making it a crime 
to portray lack of virtue in a subordinate group, perhaps we 
should consider whether those in power will resist the temptation 
to adapt the rule and apply its protections to themselves. 
B. THE IssuE OF EouALITY oF AccEss 
Of course this is not to say that new exceptions are never 
appropriate, that civil libertarian ideas of free speech are above 
criticism, or that the doctrine as applied by the courts is perfect. 
None of that is so. Instead, it is to suggest that exceptions to 
broad protection for speech are inherently dangerous and likely 
to produce unintended negative consequences. For that reason, 
changes should be approached with the greatest care and with a 
deep historical understanding of the purposes served by, for ex-
ample, the views of Justice Brandeis. 
But before we congratulate ourselves too fully on the cur-
rent state of the law, we should pay careful attention to the con-
cerns of thoughtful critics of current doctrine. They have 
important things to say about the inequalities and lack of access 
that characterize our current system of freedom of expression. 
Access to speech and restriction of speech because of the ideas 
expressed are fundamentally different questions. 
Access raises issues like the concentration of media owner-
ship, the effect of advertising revenue on the subjects covered by 
the media, campaign finance reform and the effect of wealth on 
the political process, the participation of corporations in politics 
on the same terms as individuals, and the importance of the pub-
lic forum as a place where those with limited resources can ex-
press their views.122 The issues here recall the late media critic 
A. J. Liebling's epigram: Freedom of the press extends only to 
those who own one. 
In issues of access, the equality vision raises the question of 
the appropriate metaphor for free speech. Is free speech a mar-
122. See, e.g., William Greider, Who Will TeU the People: The Betrayal of American 
Democracy (Simon & Schuster, 1992); Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and 
the Reagan Presidency (Farrar Straus Giroux, 1988); Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Mo-
nopoly (Beacon Press, 2d ed. 1987); Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The 
Ambiguous Legacy of Civil LibertllrUmism (U. of Calif. Press, 1991); The Public Mind 
with Bill Moyers, Shows 1-4, Nov. 8, 15, 22, and 29, 1989 (Journal Graphics Inc.) 
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ketplace of ideas? If so, is the market, if not a monopoly, in fact 
at least an oligopoly in which competition is severely limited? 
Should our metaphor instead be the town meeting? In the town 
meeting (ideally) all points of view would get expressed, but 
wealth and power would not mean that some points of view ex-
clude or overwhelm others.123 
Mark Thshnet has suggested that the Court is using free 
speech doctrine much as the Lochnert24 court used substantive 
due process, to entrench the privileges of economic power. 
Lochner, he suggested, protected economic investments. Treat-
ing unlimited campaign expenditures as speech protects the in-
vestments of the powerful in politicians, a simple way to protect 
economic privilege.12s 
I am sympathetic to access concerns, and I believe those who 
raise them have identified a major problem. Whether cures exist 
and whether they would be worse than the disease is another 
matter. 
Professor MacKinnon is right in saying that free speech doc-
trine has not guaranteed free and equal speech. This observation 
does not support proposals to revise rules prohibiting censorship 
based on content or viewpoint. Arguments for greater equality 
of access are fundamentally different from demands to shrink the 
domain of free speech because of the ideas expressed. Greater 
access does not involve direct exclusion of topics from the public 
dialogue because of content or point of view. Proponents of 
greater equality of access seek to expand both the subjects dis-
cussed and the number and range of participants in the dialogue, 
not to restrict them. Such proposals, however, can, and often do, 
involve restrictions on quantity of speech by some in the interests 
of equality. They involve potential dangers to free speech as well 
as benefits. Efforts to expand access raise crucial and difficult 
issues and deserve much more public attention. Unlike the free 
speech revisionists, most access advocates do at least accept the 
basic principles of the First Amendment. 
It is natural to react with distress to decisions that protect 
wearing "Fuck the Draft" slogans on one's jacket, that protect 
burning the American flag as a political protest, and that allow 
statements like one in Hustler Magazine purportedly about Mr. 
123. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 
(Kennikat Press, 1948). 
124. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
125. Mark Thshnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1387 (1984). The gen-
eralization is somewhat less powerful after Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Com-
merce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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Jerry Falwell's "first time." But in the wars of the First Amend-
ment there will always be front lines. Changing doctrine to allow 
more suppression moves the location of the front line and ex-
poses speech, once thought clearly protected, to the artillery of 
the censors. Changes in doctrine have costs as well as benefits. 
C. NEW DIRECTIONS 
Can we, as Calvin Massey asks, really triumph over the 
darker sides of a nature by repression instead of dialogue and 
understanding?126 Perhaps we should instead consider different 
approaches to some problems raised by freedom of speech. Do 
we teach basic rules of nonviolent communication?127 Do we 
teach avoidance of name calling, respect for those with different 
views, and not to assume that those who disagree with us act 
from evil motives? Do we seriously teach communication skills 
and study peacemaking?128 Could we consider treating many 
disagreements about a hostile learning environment as legitimate 
disagreements among people of good will? If so we could use 
techniques of mediationl29 and discussion to explore and under-
stand our differences, instead of relying on punishment and coer-
cion. Do we recognize that none of us has a monopoly on virtue 
or on progressive ideas? 
As an example of how a different approach could be used, 
we might consider the controversy about students who wore 
Confederate flag patches to school. Some schools responded by 
encouraging student dialogue about what the Confederate flag 
meant to those who wore it and also what the Confederate flag 
meant to black students. They coupled the dialogue with discus-
sion of guarantees of liberty. Schools following this approach 
probably did more for improved race relations than those that 
simply responded by repressing the flag wearers. The flag wear-
ers and the black students had very different ideas about the 
meaning of the Confederate flag. After learning what the Con-
126. Calvin R. Massey, Pure Symbols and the First Amendment, 17 Hastings Const. 
L.Q. 369, 375-76 (1990). 
127. Marshall B. Rosenberg, A Model for Nonviolent Communication (New Society 
Publishers, 1983). 
128. Gray Cox, The Ways of Peace: A Philosophy of Peace as Action (Paulist Press, 
1986). Cf. Sherod Miller et al., Straight Talk: A New Way to Get Closer to Others by 
Saying What You Really Mean (Rawson, Wade Publishers, 1981). 
129. Neil H. Katz and John W. Lawyer, Communication and Conflict Resolution 
Skills (Kendall/Hunt, 1985). 
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federate flag meant to black students, some white students de-
cided to stop wearing it.Bo 
Our goal must be acceptance of the equal citizenship of peo-
ple who are different-because of race, sex, creed, or sexual ori-
entation. True acceptance requires a change in the way people 
think: it is a problem of conscience. As William Walwyn wrote 
(on the subject of religious toleration) in 1644: 
[T]he conscience, being subject only to reason (either that 
which is indeed, or seems to him which hears it to be so), can 
only be convinced or persuaded thereby. Force makes it run 
back and struggle. It is the nature of every man to be of any 
judgement rather than him that forces.t3t 
The psychological fact of resistance to compulsion should lead us 
to look for alternative methods. 
Consider the case of the University of Pennsylvania student, 
distressed by noisy students outside his dormitory window, who 
when other entreaties failed, yelled that the students were "water 
buffaloes. "132 The student insists that he did not intend the re-
mark as a racist slur, and I take him at his word. The black stu-
dents who heard the remark, quite naturally, interpreted it as a 
racist slur. Soon the yelling student found himself charged with 
racial harassment. The University and the students who charged 
him found themselves cast in the role of suppressors of speech. 
The case became a cause, and I think it did much more harm 
than good to the cause of racial harmony. 
What if, instead, both sides-both with grievances (noise 
and insult)-had been sent to mediation. The African American 
students could have explained what the words meant to them and 
why. The student who yelled the epithet might have explained 
how he felt about the disruption of his studies by noise. With 
wise guidance, both might have understood the other's perspec-
tives and have reconciled. From my experience with mediation, I 
would be optimistic about understanding and reconciliation in-
stead of increased hostility. But until universities seriously study 
130. Nat Hentoff, The Boy With a Confederate Flag on His Back, Village Voice, July 
5, 1988, at 31. I appeared as counsel for students wearing the Confederate flag patch and 
played a part in crafting settlements that emphasized use of dialogue and techniques like 
mediation. The Confederate flag had very different meanings to some of the students 
wearing it and to black students. 
131. William Walwyn, The Compassionate Samaritane (1644) in David Wootton, ed., 
Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England 251 
(Penguin Books, 1986). 
132. Laurence R. Stains, Speech Impediment, Rolling Stone, Aug. 5, 1993, at 45. 
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peacemaking themselves, they may find it difficult to teach to 
their students. 
Hateful speech causes emotional pain and other negative ef-
fects. The rules against a hostile learning environment suppress 
free discussion and intellectual inquiry. If there is an escape 
from the dilemma, if there is hope for common ground, the di-
lemma must be transcended rather than simply solved. 
In A Guide for the Perplexed, E. F. Schumacher, notes that 
basic human problems are divergent problems, incapable of sim-
ple logical resolution: 
Education presents the classical example of a divergent prob-
lem, and so of course does politics, where the most frequently 
encountered pair of opposites is "freedom" and "equality," 
which in fact means freedom versus equality. For if natural 
forces are left free, i.e., left to themselves, the strong will pros-
per and the weak will suffer, and there will be no trace of 
equality. The enforcement of equality, on the other hand, re-
quires the curtailment of freedom-unless something inter-
venes from a higher leve/.133 
The factors Schumacher points to are love, empathy, participa-
tion mystique, understanding, and compassion, factors also em-
phasized by Gray Cox when he provocatively suggests that there 
are Ways of Peace, ways that can be learned, followed, and 
taught.134 In the end, these ways can accomplish far more than 
censorship could ever hope to. 
* * * * * 
Advocates of fundamental change in free speech doctrine 
are influential. They have to be taken seriously because they ad-
dress important and difficult issues and because they are widely 
published in influential places. The idea of free speech is not 
perfect, and it has always offered shelter to the expression of evil 
ideas. The system tends to support reigning orthodoxies because 
economic power tends to shape the political system and the sys-
tem of free expressionl35 because of problems of access, and also 
because of the strength of intellectual inertia. But suppression 
133. E.F. Schumacher, A Guide for the Perplexed 123-24 (Harper & Row, 1977) (em-
phasis in original). 
134. See also William Walwyn, The Power of Love (1643), in 2 William Haller, ed., 
Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution 1638-1647 at 271 (Colum. U. Press, 1934) 
135. James Harrington, The Art of Lawgiving in Three Books (1659) excerpted and 
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because of the ideas expressed only compounds this problem. 
Free speech is essential if reigning orthodoxies are to be changed. 
Unfortunately many current criticisms and responses lack 
historical and psychological perspective. Greater historical per-
spective would enrich the debate and counsel hesitation in jet-
tisoning the basic ideas of free speech. A psychological 
perspective-and also a spiritual one, for they are two sides of 
the same coin-suggests the need to look for ways to transcend 
the dilemma. 
